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In this paper we study top executive turnover in Italian Banks over the period 1993-2001. We 
relate the probability of survival of top executives (Presidents, CEOs and General Managers) 
to bank performance and the manager’s local connections, controlling for (observable and 
unobservable) bank and manager characteristics by exploiting longitudinal information on 
bank-manager appointments. We measure the extent? of managers’ local connections by the 
distance between the province of the bank’s headquarters and the manager’s province of birth. 
We show that top managers tend to be local in the sense that the distribution of this distance is 
heavily skewed towards zero. On the basis of this evidence, we address two questions. First, 
we investigate whether connections affect the duration of the appointment at the bank. 
Second, we ask whether connections entrench managers at the expense of the bank’s 
performance. We find that connections generally increase the probabilities of managers 
surviving at their banks, and that the positive effect of performance on tenure (as amply 
documented by the executive turnover literature) disappears once connections are taken into 
account. On the other hand, we provide evidence against the hypothesis that managerial 
connections contain information valuable for enhancing a bank’s performance. In particular, 
we find that highly connected boards cause the shorter survival of banks, and that those who 
benefit from connections are top managers themselves (mostly Presidents and General 
Managers). This suggests that connections may be collusion devices with which to maintain 
and share rents. 
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1. Introduction 
In this paper we study the turnover of top executives of Italian banks in relation to a bank’s 
performance and the local connections of its manager, controlling for observable and unobservable 
bank  and  manager  characteristics  by  exploiting  longitudinal  information  on  bank-manager 
appointments. 
It has been widely documented that connections and social networks play a crucial role in 
labor  outcomes  by  affecting  the  circulation  of  information  about  employment  opportunities, 
turnover rates, chances of obtaining a higher salary, and labor market participation (see for example 
Goyal 2007, and the survey by Ioannides and Loury 2004). Connections and network effects are 
particularly important for  positions and industries where what matters is information about the 
person’s quality and the information that s/he may have acquired about the business. Such effects 
are of substantial importance for top managers. 
Banking is an industry of particular interest when investigating the above issues because it is 
information-intensive. The literature shows that relationship lending is important chiefly for small 
and  medium-sized  firms  where  “soft”  borrower-specific  information  matters  (Bhattacharya  and 
Chiesa 1995, Petersen and Rajan 1994, Degryse and Ongena 2005). One dimension of relationship 
banking is “distance”, which is measured in various ways: distance between the bank’s headquarters 
and the borrower (Casolaro and Mistrulli 2007), between the lending branch and its customers 
(Petersen and Rajan 2002, Degryse and Ongena 2005, Carling and Lundberg 2005), and between 
hierarchical layers in the bank (Stein 2002). 
The Italian banking industry offers a good environment in which to study these issues for a 
number of reasons. First, in the absence of a well-developed capital market, banks provide the 
largest share of outside funds, in particular to small and medium-sized firms. Second, the Italian 
population is local: according to the 2001 Census, 86.23% of Italians live in their region of birth, 
and 46.47% in their province of birth.
1 This suggests that the bulk of the Italian population stays 
very close to their birthplaces over time, with the potential of developing local connections. The 
importance of these connections for labor market outcomes has been documented by Cingano and 
Rosolia (2007), who show that around 70% of the manufacturing workers in their sample worked in 
their province of birth, and that employed contacts significantly increased their probability of re-
employment. 
Third, the Italian banking industry has undergone major changes which have simultaneously 
increased the importance of market forces and of local forces. Before 1990 the Italian banking 
industry was heavily protected by banking legislation  enacted during the Depression years in order 
                                                            
1 A province is administratively similar to a U.S. county.  
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to enhance bank stability both through severe restrictions on competition (Guiso et al. 2006), and 
through government ownership of banks. In the 1990s several pieces of legislation allowed banks 
formerly chartered as public institutions to be converted into joint stock companies, and this paved 
the way to their privatization and to an increase in competition. However, the controlling blocks of 
many newly-privatized banks were allocated to Bank Foundations, which were accountable only to 
the local community and had close ties with particular cities. This increased the importance of local, 
as  opposed  to  nationwide,  factors  in  bank  governance.  As  a  result  of  the  sweeping  regulatory 
changes  of  the  1990s,  technological  innovations,  and  the  prospects  of  European  monetary 
unification, between 1990 and 2001 552 mergers and acquisitions between banks took place in Italy 
to involve approximately 50% of deposits, while in the same period the number of banks declined 
from 1061 to 769 (Panetta 2004). 
In  an  ideal  world,  banks  would  like  to  hire,  promote,  and  retain  the  most  talented  top 
managers. Hence they would want to draw on the largest possible pool of talent, and this would 
give rise to geographically diverse top managements. However, a number of frictions may generate 
a different kind of behaviour. There are two competing hypotheses as to why banks may prefer to 
hire local managers even after they have conducted a search in a geographically diversified pool. 
The first explanation relies on the fact that a local banker may have a better knowledge of 
the local economy and of the local business community, and this information can be used for the 
bank’s  benefit.  Evidence  of  this  is  provided  by  the  above-mentioned  literature  on  relationship 
lending.  Further  evidence  that  social  networks  and  connections  facilitate  information  flows  is 
furnished by the mutual fund industry. Mutual fund managers invest more in firms within their 
network and they earn higher returns (Cohen et al. 2007). Analysts with school ties to a company’s 
senior  officers  outperform  on  their  stock  recommendations  (Frazzini  et  al.  2008).  Similarly, 
geographically  proximate  U.S.  analysts  possess  an  information  advantage  which  translates  into 
better performance (Malloy 2003). More  generally, social capital has a local dimension, and it 
matters in financial development (Guiso et al. 2005). Political connections, too, may help a bank’s 
performance. In a cross-country study, Faccio (2006) has analyzed the effects of having politically 
connected CEOs and directors on the board, and shown the widespread presence of politically-
connected controlling shareholders and/or top officers. 
An alternative and less benign hypothesis is that banks have the power to distribute large 
amounts of benefits: monetary, private and political. This idea has been put forward by several 
studies in the literature. The benefits from belonging to the networks of the French business élite 
(alumni of the Grandes Ecoles) have been documented by Nguyen-Dang (2006). He finds that, 
when the CEO and some board members belong to the same alumni network, turnover-performance  
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sensitivity is lower, and if the connected CEO is ousted s/he is more likely to find a new job. 
Kramarz and Thesmar (2006) provide evidence that politically connected French CEOs determine 
the composition of the board of the companies that they run, and this helps them retain their jobs 
after poor performance. Similarly, Sapienza (2004) has analysed political influence on state-owned 
Italian banks, finding that they provide support for the winning parties in the form of subsidized 
loans. The interplay between connections and individual and firm performance has been studied by 
Bandiera  et  al.  (2007)  to  evaluate  whether  the  existence  of  social  connections  within  a 
managers/workers organization is beneficial to the firm’s overall performance. They find that only 
when managers have high-powered incentives do they favour high-ability workers regardless of 
their connections; otherwise they favour connected workers regardless of their ability. 
To reinforce the latter interpretation, the power of banks to distribute monetary, private and 
political benefits is based on collusion amongst their top managers, and it is reasonable to expect 
that collusion is more likely to be established and maintained among members of the same network. 
For example, Subrahmanyam (2008) shows that members of board of directors are not effective 
monitors of the CEO because they are likely to belong to the CEO’s social network and they want 
to preserve their “social capital”. Local top managers are more likely to belong to same network and 
therefore to collude with each other than non-local managers. Hence top managers may tend to be 
local even in banks with geographically spread operations. It is worth noting that, in Italy, the local 
dimension of bankers’ power has been reinforced by the creation of Bank Foundations, which, as 
mentioned, have close ties with particular cities. 
The connections of the executive, the performance of the institutions, M&As, and regulatory 
changes jointly affect the turnover of bankers. Turnover is a significant ingredient of governance: a 
negative relationship between turnover and performance is indicative of good governance. In what 
follows we will focus on turnover of Italian bankers in order to shed light on two related issues. 
First we investigate the relative importance of connections and performance as determinants of 
managerial turnover and of the resulting tenure at a bank. Second, we test the competing hypotheses 
that connections  have  an  information  value that  helps  bank’s  performance,  or  that connections 
foster collusion among top managers and affect performance negatively.  
To measure the strength of a manager’s connections we use information on the distance 
between his/her province of birth and the province where the bank is headquartered. According to 
this  measure  of  connection,  the  greater  the  distance,  the  fewer  the  manager’s  connections. 
Although, as said, the banking literature has developed various measures of “distance”, to the best 
of our knowledge this is the first time that social and economic connections are measured in this  
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way. Because of the aforementioned low mobility of the Italian population, we believe that distance 
is a measure of connections suitable for the problem at hand.    
We integrated information from different sources in order to obtain data on the universe of 
Italian banks for the period 1993-2001, as well as on a rich set of characteristics of their Presidents, 
CEOs and General Managers. This enabled us to study the job tenure of top managers by exploiting 
matched bank/manager data for the period considered. In particular, for each bank we were able to 
determine the number of top managers in place, and to follow them throughout their careers at the 
bank.  We  were  also  able  to  track  the  mobility  of  the  top  managers  across  banks  by  uniquely 
identifying individuals employed in the three positions considered in the banking sector during the 
period considered. 
The  profound  regulatory  changes  that  took  place  over  the  period  considered  could  in 
principle be exploited as an exogenous source of variation. However, in practice it is very difficult 
to trace the effects of this process on managerial turnover, because it resulted from overlapping 
waves of changes whose implementation was largely spread over time. For this reason, in what 
follows our identification strategy will not rely on instrumental variable methods; rather, it will 
exploit the availability of panel data. 
Our empirical analysis consists of the following steps. First, we model the probability of 
turnover at each time period conditional on the tenure of managers at the bank, thus studying the 
determinants of the dynamics that lead to exit from the position. We let such probability depend 
upon a large set of observable characteristics as well as on bank/?manager unobservables which 
were match-specific. If the risk of turnover at each time period is known, the survival probabilities 
of managers at banks can be estimated allowing for differential effects of connections on their shape 
and level. This approach allows us to study whether survival probabilities differ on average across 
bank  types  or  whether  they  vary  with  manager  characteristics,  and  also  to  examine  how  the 
dynamics  that  generate  turnover  are  affected  by  such  characteristics  (and,  in  particular,  by 
connections). Second, we used longitudinal information on managers at banks in order to evaluate 
the causal effect of connections on bank performance and bank survival. To this end we control for 
unobserved bank heterogeneity by means of fixed effect regressions and use mobility across banks 
as an additional source of variability to control for unobserved heterogeneity of managers.  
To preview our main results, we find that local connections matter in various ways for 
Italian bankers. Bankers are local in the sense that the distribution of the variable ‘distance’ is 
heavily skewed towards zero. This holds true for all the positions considered and regardless of the 
bank’s degree of geographical concentration: that is, the finding applies to banks that operate both 
locally  and nationwide. Moreover,  banks with more geographically concentrated  operations are  
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more likely to employ local managers in the three positions considered. In regard to the probability 
of remaining in the job, having more connections increases survival probabilities for Presidents and 
General Managers by around 25% and 20% on average, respectively, but has no effect on the tenure 
of CEOs. Furthermore, we find that, for all the positions considered, tenure at a bank does not 
depend on performance – as measured either by ROE or by EBITDA over Total Assets – once 
connections  have  been  accounted  for.  As  for  the  two  competing  hypotheses  on  the  role  of 
connections, our results can be summarised as follows. First, we find evidence of negative returns to 
connections in more geographically concentrated banks, that is, in banks where connections are 
most likely to play an important role. Second, we find that connected boards affect bank survival 
negatively. Overall, these findings are fully consistent with the hypothesis that connections are 
collusion devices used to share and maintain rents, but not with the hypothesis that connections 
convey information that helps a bank’s performance. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the main characteristics of 
the information available, while descriptive statistics are presented in Section 3. In Section 4 we 
illustrate the empirical strategy used to investigate the causal effects of connections on the tenure of 
top managers as well as on bank performance. The results are presented and discussed in Section 5, 
while Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Data  
The aim of this section is to describe the sources of information exploited throughout the 
analysis.  First,  we  will  describe  how  we  combined  data  from  complementary  administrative 
archives to obtain information on both banks and managers for the time period considered. We will 
then present the bank and manager characteristics that are necessary for our specification. 
 
2.1 Data sources 
We made use of data from three complementary sources: a dataset that contains mainly 
bank-level information (Bilbank), and two datasets on the characteristics of managers appointed at 
banks  (Annuario  ABI  and  Telemaco).  Bilbank  is  a  data  source  managed  by  the  Italian  Bank 
Association (ABI) which provides bank-level information on the balance sheets, group affiliations 
and  major  operations  (like  M&As)  of  all  the  banks  operating  in  Italy.  Annuario  ABI  (ABI 
Yearbook) provides information on the identities and the level of education of CEOs, Presidents 
and other members of the boards of directors of Italian banks. Finally, the Italian Chamber of 
Commerce’s Telemaco data bank provides information about bank managers’ dates and places of  
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birth.  In  addition  to  these  sources,  information  on  the  number  of  branches  per  province  was 
gathered through the Bank of Italy. 
Our reference population comprises all banks operating in Italy during the period 1993-
2001. It thus covering a time span in which the sweeping regulatory reforms that took place in Italy 
during the 1990s displayed their major effects. Longitudinal information on each bank was obtained 
from Bilbank by following banks over the time window considered. Bank information such as 
balance sheets was available on a yearly basis, so that a panel of banks for up to nine years could be 
defined. We were able to obtain information on Presidents, CEOs, and General Managers for each 
bank and in each year, and this information was used to merge managers’ characteristics into our 
data by using Annuario ABI and Telemaco. Consequently, our final dataset consisted of matched 
bank/?manager  data  with  8,371  observations  referring  to  739  banks  and  1736  managers.  Most 
importantly, this enabled us to follow managers through their different appointments at banks over 
the period considered. 
 
2.1.1 Bank characteristics 
In what follows we will describe the information on banks obtained from the combination of 
data sources. The list of variables available for banks is reported in the bottom panel of Table 1. 
Since  our  reference  population  comprises  several  types  of  banks  (Commercial,  Savings, 
Mutual, Cooperative and Rural), we decided to classify banks into two main groups according to 
their voting mechanisms.
2 The first group includes banks whose voting mechanisms is based on the 
number of shares owned, i.e. Commercial and Saving banks converted into joint stock companies. 
The second group comprises Mutual, Rural and Cooperative banks. Mutual Banks and Rural and 
Cooperative  Banks  are  all  cooperatives  and  their  governance  establishes  a  per  capita  voting 
mechanism which gives each member of the coop the same voting rights regardless of the shares 
owned. This shields these banks against hostile takeovers, and entrenches their top managers more 
than those of Commercial banks, and Saving banks. The fact that the members of these cooperatives 
are  often  employees  of  the  bank  themselves  as  well  as  being  local  residents,  and  the  legal 
restrictions that until 1986 prevented these banks from branching outside a narrow geographical 
area, make them essentially local banks (see Guiso et al. 2006). To reinforce this notion, it is worth 
pointing out that in some instances the bank charter establishes that a minimum proportion of the 
directors must be drawn from the local community and that Rural and Cooperative banks must 
                                                            
2 Although these types had different origins reflecting their initial specializations, the distinction among them became 
blurred over time with the gradual repeal of the 1936 Italian banking law, so that they eventually came to perform the 
same functions. 
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make at least 50% of their loans to their members and reinvest at least 70% of their profits in the 
local community. 
For each bank we know whether the bank is independent or affiliated to a Bank Holding 
Company (BHC), whether it is the head of a BHC and whether it is listed on the Italian stock 
exchange. In the period considered, only 20% of Commercial and Saving banks and 2% of Mutual, 
Cooperative, and Rural banks were listed on the Italian stock exchange. We also know the province 
and city  of in  which the bank’s  headquarters is   located. Using information on  the  number  of 
branches per province, we constructed an index of geographic concentration of bank operations 
defined as the fraction of branches in the province of the bank’s headquarters over the total number 
of branches of that bank (thus implying that if this index assume value one, the bank operates only 
in one province). We measured bank size by the value of total assets. Only for listed banks we have 
information on price/earnings ratio, and on gross dividend per share. 
We  distinguished  between  episodes  of  mergers  and  acquisitions  that  took  place  over  the 
period considered. Each bank operating in Italy is identified by its ABI code. We say that a merger 
takes place if the ABI code of the target bank disappears after the merger. In this case President, 
CEO and General Managers of the target bank cease. We say that an acquisition takes place if the 
ABI code of the target bank remains after the acquisition. In this case the target bank maintains the 
board of directors, although individual directors and top managers not on the board may change.
3 
Owing  to  the  numerous  M&A  episodes  that  took  place  in  the  sample  period  (net  of  newly-
established banks), the number of ABI codes (indicator of the number of banks) in our sample 
decreased from 619 in 1993 to 566 in 2001. As a result, the fraction of independent banks in our 
sample  diminished.  We  were  also  able  to  distinguish  between  banks  that  have  changed  their 
position within a BHC whilst maintaining their ABI code, and banks formerly in a BHC which  
became  independent. 
Finally, as very few Italian banks are listed, we decided to focus only on accounting-based 
measures of performance, despite the well-known drawback that they may be manipulated by the 
executives  themselves. The  performance  indicators  that  we considered are the return on equity 
(ROE) and earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) divided by total 
assets. We chose not to use information about non-performing loans, because these may be distorted 
by  the  ample  discretionary  power  on  the  timing  of  their  disclosure.  Furthermore,  the  above-
mentioned profit-reinvestment policy of Mutual and Rural banks often furnishes additional funding 
for the weakest firms, thus depriving non-performing loans of a useful signalling role. To overcome 
                                                            
3 See Focarelli et al. (2002) for a similar definition.  
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the  problems  arising  from  the  possibility  that  the  accounting  performance  measure  might  be 
manipulated, we also used bank survival as a crude measure of bank performance.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
2.1.2 Top manager’s characteristics 
The list of manager characteristics that we were able to reconstruct is reported in the top 
panel of Table 1. We have information on the following managerial characteristics: age, education, 
place of birth, and whether the manager had received an honorary title. Education is our main 
measure of manager’s human capital. In Italy it is quite common for honorary titles to be bestowed 
on people that have distinguished themselves in service to the country, their community, or their 
business. The importance of honorary titles as indicative of connections has also been suggested by 
Guiso et al. (2005).
4 
Throughout this paper we will measure the strength of a bank manager’s local connections 
by the distance between his/her province of birth and the province where the bank is headquartered. 
Given the relatively low mobility of the Italian population, living in the same area where one was 
born is still common in Italy, and over time it enables individuals to develop important networks of 
connections.  More  specifically,  distance  is  obtained  by  calculating  the  spherical  distance  (i.e. 
corrected  for  the  earth  surface  curvature)  measured  in  kilometres  between  the  geographical 
coordinates (in degrees, minutes, and seconds) of the province of the bank’s headquarters and the 
manager’s province of birth. We interpret this variable in the sense that the greater the distance, the 
fewer the manager’s connections. 
Only  limited  information  on  a  manager’s  appointment  at  the  bank  was  available.  In 
particular, we were only able to reconstruct the manager’s position at the bank and (but not in all 
cases) the starting date of the appointment. The number of positions considered varies according to 
the type of bank. Most Commercial and Saving banks have a President with a supervisory role, a 
CEO with an executive role, and a General Manager. In Mutual, Rural and Cooperative banks, 
instead, the President often also performs the functions of the CEO, so that the latter position is 
observed only in very few banks of this type. 
Our data provide information about the top bankers at the survey time of each year (June 
30).
5 Using this information we were able to follow managers throughout their careers at their banks 
over the period 1993-2001; and in each year we defined their job tenure as the number of years 
                                                            
4 In the past it was much more common for bankers to hold honorary titles: for example, Guiso et al. (2005) show that 
65% of Saving banks’ directors in 1933 had the title of “cavaliere” (“knight”). 
5 Thus we have no information on spells on boards  completed in between two consecutive survey years. Whilst this 
may mean that turnover is underestimated, anecdotal evidence indicates that instances of top executives resigning or 
being fired after only a few months in the job are rare.  
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spent in the same position. Unfortunately, our data do not allow us to identify the causes of the 
turnover of managers at a bank, e.g. forced resignation, voluntary quit, death, illness or retirement. 
Furthermore, we have no information on whether the bank charter specifies a mandatory retirement 
age. 
Job  durations  can  be  right  censored  because  we  don’t  have  information  about  board 
memberships after 2001 (our last survey year). Note that left censored job durations may appear in 
the data, because for 1993 we observe the stock of managers in place in the universe of the banks 
operating in Italy, but we don’t know when their position at the bank had started. We partially 
overcame this problem by exploiting additional information on the starting dates of jobs which we 
were able to retrieve for listed banks. However, the number of left-censored observations remained 
non-negligible. In particular, left censoring appears to be more problematic for managers in Mutual, 
Rural and Cooperative banks, where around 54% of managers are left censored compared to 34% of 
managers in Commercial and Savings banks. Presidents are on average more likely to have left-
censored  durations  (49%)  than  General  Managers  and  CEOs  (around  35%).  We  find  that  left 
censoring  is  strongly  associated  with  being  employed  in  banks  that  are  geographically  more 
concentrated. This reflects in the lower mobility of managers at Mutual, Rural and Cooperative 
banks compared to Commercial and Savings banks. For example, in the former case around 37% of 
Presidents who were observed on the board in 1993 remain in the same position throughout the time 
window covered by our analysis. For Commercial and Savings banks this number decreases to 5%. 
However, the difference between these figures is less pronounced if we look at General Managers 
and CEOs. Moreover, we find that the propensity to have left-censored appointments varies greatly 
along several bank and manager dimensions, and in particular that is positively associated with the 
age of the manager, connections and with having a honorary title. 
 
3. Descriptive analysis 
The aim of this section is to discuss the sample selection criteria adopted that led to the final 
sample used in the analysis, as well as to provide descriptive statistics about bank and manager 
characteristics. Here and in what follows the observations will refer to matched bank/manager data: 
that is, for each bank over the window considered we have repeated observations over time for the 
same manager, and observations for all the top managers appointed in each year. 
We applied the following minor selection criteria to obtain the sample used for the empirical 
analysis.  First,  we  excluded  observations  referring  to  managers  for  whom  we  were  unable  to 
retrieve information about their place of birth, and thus the measure of connection (this number 
proved to be negligible). Second, since almost all Mutual, Rural and Cooperative banks did not  
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have a CEO (as discussed in the previous section), for this group of banks we limited observations 
only to Presidents and General Managers. Again, this selection proved to be not binding. Finally, 
we decided to consider the top executive turnover resulting from acquisitions but not from mergers, 
because after a merger turnover occurs with probability one by definition. As a result of these steps, 
our final sample consists of 8,371 observations referred to 739 banks and 1736 managers.
6 
Table 2 reports summary statistics for bank characteristics by bank type. Unlike Commercial 
and  Saving  banks,  Mutual,  Rural  and  Cooperative  banks  tend  not  to  be  headquartered  in  a 
provincial  capital, tend to be  independent, and are  less likely  to be listed on the Italian Stock 
Exchange or to be heads of a BHC. As expected, Commercial and Saving banks are less likely to 
have their branches concentrated in the province where the bank is headquartered: on average 66% 
of their branches are in the headquarter province vis-à-vis 92% for the other group of banks.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
The  distribution  of  ROE  across  bank  types  appears  markedly  different,  with  Commercial  and 
Saving banks presenting smaller values on average. In fact, we found that the same result holds at 
all  percentiles  of  the  ROE  distribution,  thus  producing  a  distribution  for  Mutual,  Rural  and 
Cooperative  banks  skewed  towards  larger  values  of  this  indicator.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
distribution of EBITDA over Total Assets does not vary across bank types.  
Table 3 reports summary statistics for manager characteristics. Presidents are on average 
older and better educated than managers in the other positions. Moreover, they are more likely than 
the others to have honorary titles. Mutual, Cooperatives and Rural banks have the lowest fraction of 
managers with college degree. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Table 4 reports percentiles of the distribution of the distance between the province of the 
bank’s headquarters and the manager’s province of birth by bank type and position. This is the key 
variable that we use to study the intensity of connections of managers. The distribution is markedly 
skewed towards zero for both types of banks, though to a lower extent for Commercial and Saving 
banks. For all positions at a bank, at least 25% of managers have values for distance equal to zero. 
In Mutual, Cooperatives and Rural banks the percentage increases to 75% for Presidents and to 50% 
for General Managers. Overall, managers in Mutual, Cooperative and Rural banks are more local 
than managers in Commercial and saving banks. Consistently with this evidence, we found that the 
proportion  of  managers  born  abroad  (which  corresponds  to  just  over  1%  of  our  sample)  is 
concentrated in Commercial and Saving banks and in the CEO position. Presidents are on average 
the most connected and CEOs the least connected. 
                                                            
6 Missing values were handled by adding “missing dummies” to the regressions considered in the following sections.  
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 [Insert Table 4 about here] 
Table 5 sheds more light on the relationship between our measure of connections and other 
observable  characteristics  of  the  manager.  We  found  that  the  level  of  connections  varies  with 
education and position. In particular, for each position, better educated managers are less connected 
than are lower educated managers, and this difference is statistically significant at the conventional 
levels. The fact that more connected managers are also less educated is not per se an indication that 
they  are  less  valuable  to  the  bank.  If  connections  affect  bank  performance  positively,  then 
connections and education can be seen as substitute dimensions of human capital. Furthermore, if 
education signals unobservable skills, and if being local provides better information about those 
skills, then being local may be a sorting device alternative to education. Moreover, we find that 
Presidents and CEOs with honorary titles are on average more connected. This is consistent both 
with the notion that the receivers of the title have honoured their local communities, as well as with 
the notion that they perform valuable lobbying services in the local communities. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
As far as turnover of managers is concerned, we find that its occurrence remains relatively 
stable over the sample period but with markedly different levels for the three positions considered. 
On average, the yearly rate of turnover is 9%, 16% and 15% for Presidents, CEOs and General 
Managers, respectively, with higher values in Commercial and Saving banks. To establish a link 
with the executive turnover literature, we modelled the occurrence of turnover as a function of bank 
and manager characteristics. The results from a simple probit regression show that an increase in 
performance negatively affects the probability of turnover regardless of the measure of performance 
considered.  Similar  conclusions  have  been  drawn  for  example  by  Brunello  et  al.  (2003),  who 
showed that for the CEOs of Italian non-financial listed firms the performance/turnover relationship 
is negative when the CEO is not the controlling shareholder; by Barro and Barro (1990), who 
examined U.S. commercial banks, finding a negative relationship between CEOs turnover and stock 
returns; and by Houston and James (1993), who found that the frequency of manager turnover 
among poorly-performing U.S. commercial banks was about the same as that in poorly-performing 
non-banks. The overall picture that emerges from our data is thus very much in line with the one 
documented by other studies on top executive turnover. However, as we mentioned above, this 
literature does not take account of the impact that the manager’s connections may have on turnover, 
which is one of the main motivations of the present study. 
Another piece of information worth considering is how job tenure relates to turnover. For 
descriptive  purposes,  in  Table  6  we  report  the  average  job  duration  for  the  three  positions 
considered, restricting the sample to observations that are not left censored and accounting for right  
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censoring by fitting a parametric lognormal model to the data. The differences across positions and 
bank types are clear-cut. Presidents on average stay longer at banks than managers in the other 
positions (almost three times longer than General Managers), and this holds particularly true for 
Mutual,  Cooperatives  and  Rural  banks,  where  Presidents  have  an  average  tenure  of  10  years 
compared to 7 years in Commercial and Saving banks (these differences are statistically significant 
at the conventional level). 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
Table 7 studies the relationship between tenure at a bank and our measure of connection by 
reporting  Kaplan-Meyer  estimates  of  the  survival  functions  for  two  groups  of  managers.  Very 
pragmatically, given the evidence provided in Table 4, we decided to estimate separate models for 
local managers, which we defined as those whose measure of distance is zero, and for managers 
with positive values of the variable ‘distance’. In presenting our results here and in what follows, 
we  shall  refer  to  these  two  groups  as  “more  connected”  and  “less  connected”  managers, 
respectively. We find that more connected Presidents and General Managers have higher survival 
probabilities than do their less connected peers, and that the difference for CEOs is not statistically 
significant. To conclude, although this evidence does not account for unobserved heterogeneity 
across managers and banks, it points to connections as a key determinant of turnover and tenure (as 
the proverb says “better wed over the mixen than over the moor”). 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 
4. Methods 
The aim of this section is to discuss the estimation strategy that we employed to study the 
relationship between top executives’ turnover and bank performance, on the one hand, and banks’ 
and managers’ characteristics on the other. We will first address the issue of how to model this 
relationship within the context of a rather standard regression approach, and discuss the role played 
by unobservable bank and manager characteristics. 
 
4.1 The identification problem 
The idea behind our strategy is most simply understood by considering a standard regression 
model where  ibt y  is the outcome of interest for manager i at bank b at time t. For example,  ibt y  may 
be thought as our preferred measure of bank performance for bank b at time t when manager i is 
appointed. Ideally, we would like to estimate the following equation: 
  ibt t ibt i b ibt y x α β η ζ ε = + + + +   (1) 
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where  ibt x  denotes a set of observable regressors which in general may vary across banks and 
managers  as  well  as  over  time.  In  our  application,  these  variables  include  bank  size  and 
characteristics of the manager such as age, education and connections. Note that in our definition 
connections are fixed over time because they are fully determined by the bank-/manager match. The 
variable  t α  is simply a time effect, and can be modelled by year dummies or a flexible polynomial 
in time. 
The remaining variables in the equation are unobservable error components. The term  i η  
represents a fixed effect of the manager, that is, the set of characteristics which are relevant to  ibt y  
but cannot be included amongst the regressors  ibt x  because they are not observable. The i η ’s in 
equation (1) thus capture unobserved heterogeneity of managers in explaining the outcome ibt y . 
Similarly,  b ζ  represents a fixed effect of the bank. Note that neither of these components varies 
with time, the former being specific to the manager across appointments in different banks, and the 
latter  being  specific  to  the  bank  regardless  of  the  manager  appointed.  Also  note  that  different 
bank/manager matches are thus allowed to have heterogeneous effects on the outcome variable. 
Finally, the term  ibt ε  denotes a random error which we will assume throughout to be uncorrelated 
(across banks and managers, and over time) with the regressors  ibt x . 
The identification ofβ , that is, of the marginal effect of  ibt x  on  ibt y , is of central interest in 
our analysis. However, estimates of this parameter obtained from the “feasible” regression of  ibt y on 
ibt x  may encounter an endogeneity problem. For example, if connections were perceived as a key 
component of human capital, more connected managers would be appointed in better organised 
banks, which would also be likely to have better performance on average. If this were the case, we 
would not be able to disentangle how much of the positive association between connections and 
performance  depends  solely  on  connections  and  how  much  of  it  is  caused  by  confounding 
unobservable effects such as, for example, the bank’s efficiency. 
The specification in (1) explicitly allows for the presence of such confounding effects, in that 
it allows for omitted regressors which can be bank- or manager-specific but remain constant over 
time. Using micro data on banks and managers over time, one could estimate (1) by including 
dummies  for  managers  and  banks,  and  testing  for  the  presence  of  confounding  effects  by 
considering their joint significance in the regression. Intuitively, for such a strategy to work one 
would need a sufficient degree of mobility of the same managers across banks over the time period 
considered. In the extreme case of no mobility of managers, we would not be able to disentangle the 
manager’s fixed effect from the bank fixed effect. The setup discussed here closely resembles the  
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identification problem dealt with by Abowd et al. (1999) in the case of matched employer/employee 
data (see also Kramarz and Thesmar 2006).
7 
 
4.2 Modeling tenure at bank 
The discussion in the previous section helps clarify that unobserved heterogeneity plays a 
key role when modelling the duration of the manager’s appointment. It is well known that duration 
analysis  produces  incorrect  results  if  unobserved  heterogeneity  is  ignored  (see,  for  example, 
Lancaster 1990). To see this, let the hazard rate at time τ be defined as the probability of turnover 
during the τ-th year at the bank conditional on the tenure attained until that year. On average, 
subjects with relatively high hazard rates for unobserved reasons leave the state of interest first, so 
that samples of survivors are selected. Differences between such samples at different times may 
then reflect behavioural differences as well as this selection effect. 
In what follows we will model the survival probabilities of bank managers separately for the 
three positions considered and by bank type. Survival probabilities will be defined by following the 
bank/manager match over time from the first to the last year at the bank. We will present the results 
from a maximum likelihood estimation of mixed proportional hazards so as to take unobserved 
heterogeneity into account (see, for example, van den Berg 2001). We experimented with different 
assumptions about the distribution of the unobserved component, all of which led to qualitatively 
similar  conclusions.  For  this  reason,  in  what  follows  we  will  present  the  results  from  a 
complementary log-log model where the baseline hazard is modelled via a quadratic polynomial in 
(logged) time and the fixed effect term is normally distributed (see Jenkins 2005).
8  
We will present predicted survival probabilities for groups of observations defined by: (a) less 
and more connected managers, (b) Commercial and Saving Banks and Mutual, Cooperative and 
Rural Banks, and (c) “high”- and “low”-performing banks, these being banks performing in the top 
or the bottom 25% of the distribution of our preferred measure of performance respectively.
9 Tests 
                                                            
7  It is worth noting that standard panel data modeling applied to model (1) does not help identify the causal effect of 
connections on the outcome ibt y . In fact, standard fixed effect estimators of  β  are obtained by regressing changes over 
time of the outcome variable (for example, changes in performance between two consecutive years when the manager i 
is appointed at bank b) on changes over time of  ibt x . As pointed out earlier in this section, connections are fixed over 
time, given the bank/manager match. Hence identification of their effect on the outcome variable is precluded using this 
approach. 
8 It is worth noting that, as expected, unobserved heterogeneity comes significantly into play in modeling survival 
probabilities:  all  tests  referring  to  the  significance  of  this  term  rejected  the  null  hypothesis  of  no  effect  at  the 
conventional levels. Our approach to modeling the probability of turnover closely resembles that of Denis, Denis and 
Sarin (1997), who include tenure amongst the determinants of turnover and thus implicitly model the hazard rate. 
Similarly  to  their approach,  our  procedure  estimates a  discrete  time  hazard  rate but  explicitly  models  unobserved 
heterogeneity (see, for example, Jenkins 2005). 
9 In all the regressions considered, we allowed for nonlinearities in the effect of performance by adopting a specification 
in  which  performance  affects  survival  probabilities  through  dummies  referred  to  quartiles  of  the  performance 
distribution.  
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for the difference amongst survival probabilities for the above groups result in tests on suitably 
defined linear combinations of the coefficients of the variables entering the proportional hazards.
10 
We limited our analysis to complete or right-censored job durations by excluding from the 
analysis those matches for which we were unable to determine the starting date of the appointment. 
Alhough this is clearly a major source of selection in our working sample, we made this choice 
because  accounting  for  left  censoring  would  require  assumptions  on  the  starting  time  of  the 
appointment at the bank which we found difficult to motivate in the context of this paper.  
 
4.3 Accounting for bank and manager unobserved heterogeneity 
As  discussed  above,  estimation  results  from  OLS  may  be  severely  biased  because  of 
unobservable  characteristics  that  are  omitted  from  the  regression  and  are  relevant  to  both 
performance and our measure of connection that follows from the bank/manager match. In addition 
to the duration analysis described in the previous section, we will therefore present regressions that 
exploit the panel dimension of our dataset in order to account for bank and manager unobserved 
heterogeneity. As pointed out earlier in this paper, however, we cannot make use of longitudinal 
information  on  bank/manager  matches  to  estimate  the  effect  of  connections  on  performance, 
because our measure of connections is match-specific and does not vary over time. For this reason, 
standard within-group estimators would fail to identify the parameter of interest without additional 
assumptions. 
To overcome this problem we exploited the additional source of variability consisting in the 
mobility of managers across banks over the period considered. We will thus focus on the subgroup 
of managers for whom there are multiple spells in the data in different banks: that is, the groups of 
managers to whom we referred as movers. Having repeated observations for the same managers in 
multiple banks, we will be able to control for manager’s unobserved heterogeneity using standard 
panel data fixed effect estimation (see for example Abowd et al. 1999). 
Since identification of the causal effects of connections relies upon the existence of movers, 
we characterized this group with respect to the variables in Table 1. We found that the key factors 
that characterize movers are bank type, position of the manager, and degree of connections. Perhaps 
as expected, we  found that mobility is  mainly  concentrated  in Commercial and  Saving Banks, 
where on average around 20% of managers are appointed in more than one bank over the period 
considered (mobility being the highest for CEOs). Just over 3% of managers in Mutual, Cooperative 
                                                            
10 Throughout our analysis standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and take into account the fact that repeated 
measurements  for  bank/manager  matches  are  available.  Moreover,  time  effects  are  controlled  for  throughout  our 
analysis by adding time dummies to all specifications considered. All the regressions considered allow for interactions 
of our measure of connections with performance, degree of local concentration of the bank, bank type and position of 
the manager either by running separate regressions for different groups of observations or including interaction terms 
amongst the explanatory variables.  
  17 
and Rural Banks actually move, and there are very few movers from one type of bank to the other, 
which indicates the existence of markets segmented by bank type. Moreover, on comparing the 
distribution of our measure of connections for movers in Table 8 against figures in Table 4, it 
appears that movers are on average less connected.  
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
 
5. Results 
5.1 Does performance matter for manager’s survival? 
In the set of figures that follows we will plot the profiles of predicted survival probabilities 
obtained  as  explained  in  Section  4.2  for  “high”  and  “low”  performing  banks,  separately  for 
Commercial  and  Savings  banks,  and  Mutual,  Rural  and  Cooperative  banks,  by  position  of  the 
manager  at  bank,  and  by  the  manager’s  degree  of  connection  (“more”  and  “less”  connected 
managers). The reason for the split by bank type is that Mutual, Rural and Cooperative banks are 
more local banks in the sense that they have smaller asset size, a higher concentration of operations 
(see  Table  2),  and  a  higher  fraction  of  managers  with  distance  equal  to  zero  (see  Table  4). 
Connections  may  therefore  come  into  play  for  bank  performance  more  for  Mutual,  Rural  and 
Cooperative banks than for Commercial and Savings ones. We will classify banks depending on 
their  accounting-based  performance  using  both  ROE  and  EBIDTA  over  Total  Assets.  The 
comparison of survival probabilities across groups will allow us to shed light on the ceteris paribus 
effects of connections and performance on the job tenure of managers at banks. The results for 
Presidents, CEOs, and General Managers are reported in Figures 1, 2, and 3, respectively. The right 
(left) hand side panel of each figure refers to predicted profiles for more (less) connected managers. 
P-values for the equality of curves within each panel are also presented. 
One  striking  finding  is  that  the  survival  probabilities  of  managers  in  low-  and  high-
performing banks appear to be the same once connections are accounted for. This is confirmed by 
the fact that the difference between the two survival curves is not statistically significant. The only 
exception is that less connected General Managers in low-performing (by ROE) Commercial and 
Saving banks have a (marginally) statistically significant lower survival probability than their peers 
in high-performing banks (see the second panel of Figure 3a). We therefore find that performance 
per se does not greatly affect survival probability for all positions, for all banks, and for the two 
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5.2 Do connections affect manager’s survival? 
In this section we directly assess how connections affect manager’s survival. Intuitively, this 
amounts to testing whether the survival probabilities expressed by the dotted (continuous) lines in 
the left hand side panel of each graph differ on average from those given by the dotted (continuous) 
lines  in  the  right  hand  side  panel.  To  this  end,  we  decided  to  run  this  test  by  looking  at  the 
coefficients  of  a  suitably  defined  regression  model.  In  the  case  of  Presidents,  our  procedure 
consisted of the following steps. First, we pooled all the survival probabilities reported in Figures 1a 
and 1b, thus obtaining 8 point estimates (representing tenure at bank from the first to the eighth 
year) for 16 curves (for a total of 128 observations). We then specified the following regression 
equation: 
  ( )
2 2
0 1 2 3 4 5 log S T T C C T C T u β β β β β β = + + + + × + × +   (2) 
 
which models logged survival probabilities  ( ) log S  as  a function of  a quadratic polynomial in 
tenure (T ) and a dummy for the degree of connections (C ). Crucially, we allowed the curves to 
have different shapes for “more” and “less connected” managers ( 1 C =  and  0 C = , respectively) by 
letting the coefficients of the quadratic polynomial depend on the connections of managers. As 
additional regressors we considered group dummies defined for bank type and performance type, as 
well as the interaction between connection and performance type. We applied the same procedure to 
CEOs and General Managers, running separate regressions for the three positions considered. 
The results of this test are presented in Table 9 and can be summarized as follows.
11 First, 
more connected Presidents and General Managers have higher survival probabilities at a bank than 
their  less  connected  peers.  In  particular,  we  found  that  the  coefficients  in  (2)  associated  with 
connections are jointly significant at the conventional level, and that this translates into a positive 
effect  of  connections  of  around  25%  and  20%  on  average  over  tenure  for  the  two  positions, 
respectively (see the first row of Table 9). The difference in survival probabilities between more 
and less connected CEOs is still positive (around 2.5%) but not statistically different from zero. 
This result clearly reflects greater hazards (that is, a higher probability of losing the job conditional 
on tenure) for less connected Presidents and General Managers on average.  
One additional dimension worth exploring is whether connections provide information on a 
manager’s ability. If a well-connected manager is more likely to be personally known by the board 
of directors, then there should be less need to rely on external signals of his/her ability such as bank 
performance. For example, if there is informal evidence suggesting that the manager is of high 
ability, it may be  easier to  deduce that a poor bank performance is due to factors beyond the 
                                                            
11 The full set of regression results is available from the authors upon request.  
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manager’s control and there is no reason to fire him/her. On this view, if connections capture only a 
“better-knowledge-of-the-manager effect”, this should lead to large positive effects of connections 
on the hazard rate in the first years of work and to smaller effects as tenure increases. We should 
observe the same pattern if, over time, a less connected manager develops the same network of 
relationships and the same behaviour of a more connected manager: in this case, too, the impact of 
connections  should  weaken  after  the  first  years  of  work.  To  address  this  issue,  for  the  three 
positions considered we tested whether the hazard rate remains constant with tenure or exhibits 
positive or negative duration dependence. 
By using the definition of the hazard rate,  ( ) log S T −∂ ∂ , we decided to run this test by 
looking at the first derivative of the estimated polynomial in equation (2).
12 Hazards rates increasing 
(decreasing) with tenure imply positive (negative) values of  ( )
2 2 log S T −∂ ∂ . If the hazard rates are 
not affected by tenure, the value of this second derivative must be zero. The results for the presence 
of duration dependence are presented in Table 9, which reports the values of the second derivative 
of  ( ) log S −  separately for “more connected” and “less connected” managers. According to the p-
values in the table, we cannot reject the hypothesis of constant hazards in all cases, thus ruling out 
any form of duration dependence.
13 
To summarize the results presented in this section, we can say that connections do not affect 
the shape of the hazard function, although they shift upwards the level resulting in higher risks for 
less connected managers. The gap caused by connections does not diminish with tenure; or put 
differently, tenure does not provide the manager with the advantages in terms of higher survival 
probability provided by local connections. Higher hazard functions are reflected in lower survival 
probabilities at bank, and we estimate that being more connected increases survival by around 20% 
and 25% for General Managers and Presidents, respectively. 
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
 
5.3 Do connections affect bank performance? 
Local connections can have either a negative or a positive effect on bank performance. A 
negative interpretation views connections as collusion devices: everything else equal, the manager 
holds the position because s/he is local, regardless of his/her skills; and connections tend to protect 
                                                            
12 The same problem could have been addressed by considering the hazard functions underlying the survival 
probabilities in Figures 1, 2 and 3. However, since the conclusions presented in what follows are qualitatively identical 
to those resulting from the estimation of hazard functions discussed in Section 4.2, we decided to decide to rely on 
equation (2) as it provides a more synthetic way of presenting the results. 
13 We experimented with different specifications of equation (2), and in particular we allowed for differential effects of 
connections on survival probabilities across bank types. We found that the absence of any form of duration dependence 
holds true for either category of banks in our sample.  
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the  manager  after  poor  bank  performance.  A  more  benign  interpretation  is  that,  since  banking 
maintains a local dimension, connections are part of the manager’s human capital. Being local 
would entail a better knowledge of the local economy and connections would allow more effective 
lobbying activity. 
To investigate if and how employing local managers affects bank performance we adopted 
the following strategy. First, to have a proxy of the ease of collusion in each bank we considered 
two measures of the degree of localness of top management: the percentage of top managerial 
positions  for  which  the  value  of  the  variable  ‘distance’  is  zero  (i.e.  the  percentage  of  local 
managers), and the average value of the variable ‘distance’ for the positions considered at the bank. 
The idea is that the more local the top management, the easier it is to collude in maintaining and 
sharing rents. 
We then regressed bank performance at each point in time on the average value of the above 
variables in the previous three years, in order to capture some dynamics in the composition of the 
top management, and all other available bank characteristics. Also, we added interactions of our 
indicators of localness of management with the degree of geographic concentration of the bank’s 
operation to study whether the effects of connections vary with the localness of the bank.
14 The 
regressions  thus  consider  only  one  observation  per  bank  at  each  point  in  time  and  allow  for 
unobserved bank heterogeneity through fixed effects estimation. 
[Insert table 10 about here] 
The  results  for  the  key  variables  considered,  which  proved  robust  to  alternative 
specifications of the regression equation, are reported in columns (1) and (2) of Table 10 using ROE 
and  EBITDA  over  Total  Assets,  respectively.  Table  10  reports  the  key  estimation  findings 
discussed  here  and in  the  next  section.  Connections,  as  measured  by  the  average  value  of  the 
variable ‘distance’ for the top management in the past three years, appear to have a marginally 
significant effect only on the latter indicator of performance (see the p-values at the end of the 
Table). In particular, according to the results in column (2), the returns to having top managements 
with  marginally  higher  values  of  the  variable  ‘distance’  increase  with  the  bank’s  degree  of 
concentration  (the  interaction  term  being  positive),  thus  implying  that  having  more  connected 
managers  is  comparatively  less  advantageous  for  banks  with  more  geographically  concentrated 
operations.  Point  estimates  using  the  results  in  column  (1),  though  not  statistically  significant, 
suggest the same conclusion. Similarly, using the coefficients reported in the table one can show 
that the returns to having top managements with a higher proportion of connected managers are 
                                                            
14 Since Commercial and Savings banks have far less geographical concentrated operations than do Mutual, Rural and 
Cooperative  banks  (see  Table  2)  classifying  banks  by  the  variable  concentration  guarantees  continuity  with  the 
stratification of banks adopted in Section 5.1.  
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negative,  though  not  statistically  different  from  zero,  for  banks  for  which  the  value  of  the 
concentration index is above 80%. 
[Insert table 11 about here] 
As the above results do not take characteristics of the top management into account, as a 
sensitivity check we complement this part of the analysis by directly modelling the heterogeneity of 
top managers. In this regard, we report two additional sets of results. First, in columns (1) and (3) of 
Table 11 we present regression results of bank performance (for ROE and EBITDA over Total 
Assets, respectively) on a flexible specification in bank and manager characteristics, dummies for 
the position of the manager at the bank, a second order polynomial in the value of the variable 
‘distance’, and a dummy for distance equal to zero. As before, we interacted all variables referring 
to  connections  with  the  concentration  index  and  we  explicitly  allowed  for  unobserved  bank 
heterogeneity by including dummy variables for banks in the regression. Differently from what we 
did in Table 10, we now use multiple observations per bank at each point in time referring to all 
managers  appointed  and  take  characteristics  of  the  managers  into  account.  Looking  at  point 
estimates shows that the relationship between performance and the variable ‘distance’ is non-linear, 
depicting basically flat profiles of ROE with respect to distance – column (1) – and profiles of 
EBITDA over Total Assets which are increasing with distance – column (3). The results in either 
column, however, confirm that our measure of connections does not play a statistically significant 
role in causing better performance. In particular, the returns to having distance equal to zero are not 
statistically different from zero for either measure of bank performance (see the p-values at the 
bottom of the two columns). 
Second, to show the role played by managers’ unobserved heterogeneity (such as geographic 
preferences), in columns (2) and (4) of Table 11 we report an attempt jointly to model bank and 
manager unobserved heterogeneity (again for ROE and EBITDA over Total Assets, respectively). 
As explained in Section 4.3, to disentangle the effect of connections and retrieve their causal effect 
on performance we took a quite novel approach and used only observations for movers, that is, 
managers appointed in more than one bank over the time period covered by our analysis (the same 
approach has been used by Kramarz and Thesmar 2006). We maintained the same specification of 
the regression equations estimated in columns (1) and (3) of Table 11, and we added in as additional 
regressors dummy variables for movers. Bearing in mind the above caveats concerning the much 
smaller sample size, only EBITDA over Total Assets appears to depend upon values of the variable 
‘distance’ – see column (4). On drawing the profiles implied by point estimates one would in fact 
conclude  that  higher  values  of  performance  correspond  to  less  connected  managers,  uniformly  
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across values of the concentration index of the bank. However, the returns to having distance equal 
to zero are again not statistically different from zero. 
Overall, according to the results presented in this section there is no evidence of positive 
returns to having well-connected top managers in the bank. If anything, the results for banks with a 
high degree of geographic concentration, where connections are most likely to play an important 
role, suggest that the returns to connections may be negative. These conclusions appear to be robust 
to the presence of unobserved bank and manager characteristics. The above findings are instead 
consistent with the hypothesis that connections are collusion devices – a hypothesis that we subject 
to further testing in the next subsection.   
 
5.4 Do connections affect bank’s survival?   
A well-known drawback to accounting-based measures of performance is that they can be 
manipulated by the managers, and for Mutual, Rural and Cooperative banks they may also reflect 
their mutual nature. The ability to manipulate performance measures is, for example, a possible 
explanation suggested by Barro and Barro (1990) for why CEO turnover in U.S. commercial banks 
is not related to accounting measures, whilst it is negatively related to market measures like stock 
performance. Thus the regression results presented in Tables 10 and 11 may be affected by the scant 
information  content  of  the  performance  indicators.  This  problem could have  been  overcome  if 
harder-to-manipulate measures of performance, like stock returns, were available. Unfortunately, 
this is not the case, since, as mentioned, only a small fraction of Italian banks are listed.  
However, the large number of mergers and acquisitions that took place among Italian banks 
in  the  sample  period  may  provide  some,  albeit  indirect,  information  about  bank  performance. 
Although almost all the mergers and acquisitions were “friendly”, and some of them were merely 
rescue operations orchestrated by the Bank of Italy, the loss of control and of bank independence, 
and, in some cases the bank’s disappearance itself, may be indicators of a negative performance. 
When a bank is merged into another, the top managerial positions considered disappear, with the 
likely loss of whatever power and rents they may have generated for their holders. Hence, whilst 
protracted losses may be masked by opaque accounting, poor performance eventually threatens the 
bank’s very survival. Using the probability of bank survival as a measure of bank performance we 
follow other studies (e.g. Prowse 1995, Crespì et al. 2004) documenting a positive relationship 
between the probability of a bank’s survival and its performance. For example Crespì et al. (2004) 
find  that  for  Spanish  Saving  banks  the  only  significant  relationship  between  performance  and 
governance intervention seems to be in the case of mergers.  
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We then complemented the results in the previous section by exploring the possibility that 
connections may negatively affect the survival of banks.
15 Columns (3) and (4) of Table 10 present 
results from a conditional logit regression of the variable “bank not existing at time t” on the same 
set of regressors considered in columns (1) and (2), controlling for the mean value over the last 
three years  of the dummies for quartiles of performance (using  ROE  and EBITDA  over Total 
Assets). The results point to a negative effect of the top management’s degree of localness on bank 
survival. The percentage of managers with distance equal to zero and its interaction with the index 
of  geographical  concentration  of  the  bank  are  jointly  significant  for  either  measure  of  bank 
performance. Point estimates  imply that banks  for which  the  value of the index is above  30% 
present negative returns to higher proportions of local managers on the survival probability. Since 
this effect increases with the bank’s degree of geographical concentration, the result is consistent 
with  the  hypothesis  that  connections  are  particularly  strong  collusion  devices  for  locally 
concentrated banks. 
To sum up, we find no evidence in favour of the hypothesis that the information content of 
managerial connections gives a positive contribution to bank performance. Our evidence instead 
suggests that connections are devices used to maintain and share managerial rents, and are thus 
detrimental to bank performance. This is not directly visible when the more opaque accounting-
based measures of performance are used, but it is captured by a more crude measure of performance 
like the probability of the bank’s survival. Consistently with the hypothesis that connections are 
collusion devices, we find that connections are only to the benefit of the top managers themselves, 
whose  survival  probability  (for  Presidents  and  General  Managers)  significantly  increases  with 
connections.  In light of  these  findings, also the  result that  performance does not  greatly affect 
bankers’  turnover  once  connections  are  accounted  for  is  consistent  with  the  hypothesis  that 
connections do not add value for the bank but instead shield managers from turnover after poor 
performance. 
 
6. Conclusions  
We have studied bank performance and manager’s local connections as determinants of 
managerial turnover in Italian banks for two reasons. First, banking is an information-sensitive 
industry where connections are potentially important. Second, Italy is a particularly interesting case 
because  recent  regulatory  changes  have  strengthened  the  importance  of  market  forces,  while 
preserving  an  environment  where  local  connections  still  play  an  important  role.  Our  research 
                                                            
15 Note that in this case a survival analysis like the one presented in Section 5.1 would seriously suffer from left 
censoring, which affects over 90% of banks in our sample. For this reason, we decided not to model the hazard rates 
and instead used the regression approach described in what follows.  
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complements  the  existing  literature  on  banker’s  turnover  by  moving  in  a  new  direction  where 
studies  on  social  networks  are  integrated  with  the  more  traditional  investigation  of  corporate 
governance in banking. 
We have measured the degree of local connections of bankers by the distance between the 
province of the bank headquarters and the banker’s province of birth. The top managers of Italian 
banks tend to be local in the sense that the distance is rather small, and in fact was zero for the large 
majority of observations in our sample. The degree of connection varies greatly for different types 
of manager, with Presidents being more local especially in Mutual, Rural and Cooperative banks. 
We find that connections generally increase the survival probabilities of Presidents and General 
Managers,  and  that  the  positive  effect  of  performance  on  tenure  (which  has  been  widely 
documented by the executive turnover literature) disappears once connections are accounted for. 
There is no evidence of positive returns to having well-connected top managers in the bank. 
If anything, the results for banks with a high degree of geographic concentration, where connections 
are most likely to play an important role, suggest that the returns may be negative. We instead find 
evidence that connections reduce the survival probability of banks, which is consistent with the 
hypothesis that connections are devices used to share and maintain local rents at the expenses of the 
bank’s performance, broadly defined to include survival. 
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Table 1: List of Variables 
Manager characteristics 
Variable name  Description  Source 
Age  Age of the manager  Telemaco 
Education  High School Graduate, College Graduate  ABI Yearbook 
Position at bank  President, CEO, General Manager  ABI Yearbook 
Place of Birth  Province of birth  Telemaco 
Foreign born  Dummy for born abroad  Telemaco 
Distance  Degree of connection   http://www.stata.com/u
sers/brising 
Honorary title  Dummy for honorary title  ABI Yearbook 
Bank characteristics 
Variable name  Description  Source 
Total Assets  Asset values at current prices  Bilbank 
City bank  Dummy for banks headquartered in a provincial 
capital  ISTAT 
Bank type  Dummy for Commercial and Savings banks  Bilbank 
Head   Dummy for banks head of a bank holding company  Bilbank 
Independent bank  Dummy for banks not part of any bank holding 
company  Bilbank 
Listed  Dummy for listed banks  Bilbank 
Headquarter area  Dummies for Northern, Central and Southern Italy  Bilbank 
Concentration  Fraction of branches in the province of the bank’s 
headquarters  Bank of Italy 
EBITDA               Earnings before interests, taxes, depreciation, and 
amortization  Bilbank 
Non-performing 
loans   Non performing loans/Total loans  Bilbank 
ROE  Return on Equity  Bilbank 
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Table 2: Bank characteristics; 1993-2001.   
Commercial, and saving banks 
(number of observations 3532) 
Mean  Standard deviation 




Head of bank holding company 
Located in Central Italy 















Assets (in log)   2.72  0.13 
ROE  0.006  0.669 
EBITDA/Total Assets  0.016  0.013 
Concentration    0.66  0.29 
Mutual,  cooperative,  and  rural  banks 
(number of observations 4839) 
Mean  Standard deviation 




Head of bank holding company 
Located in Central Italy 















Assets (in log)   2.52  0.12 
ROE  0.082  0.076 
EBITDA/Total Asset  0.015  0.008 
Concentration   0.92  0.17 
For a description of the variables and their sources see Table 1. 
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Table 3: Manager’s characteristics by bank category; 1993-2001.  For a description of the variables 
and their sources see Table 1. 
  Commercial and Savings 
banks  
Mutual, Cooperative and 
Rural banks  
President     
Age in years 
% with college degree 







CEO     
Age in years 
% with college degree 







General Manager     
Age in years 
% with college degree 








Table  4:  Distribution  of  the  distance  between  the  province  of  the  bank's  headquarters  and  the 
manager’s province of birth, for Mutual, Cooperatives, and Rural Banks, and for Commercial and 
Saving  Banks  by  position  held  by  the  manager.  Distance  is  defined  as  the  distance  between  the 
geographical coordinates of two provinces corrected for the earth surface curvature, in kilometres. For 
example, the entry 90.59 below indicates that 75% of the General Managers of Mutual, Cooperatives, and 
Rural Banks were born in provinces at a distance ≤ 90.59km from the province of the bank’s headquarters. 
An entry 0.00 in column 50% indicates that the median manager in that category was born in the same 
province as the bank’s headquarters; 1993-2001. For a description of the other variables and their sources 
see Table 1. 
Mutual, Cooperatives, and Rural Banks 
  5%  25%  50%  75%  95% 
President  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  112.45 
General Manager  0.00  0.00  0.00  90.59  625.23 
Commercial and Saving Banks 
President  0.00  0.00  0.00  83.47  500.83 
CEO  0.00  0.00  96.32  365.40  787.69 
General Manager  0.00  0.00  75.70  249.77  709.60 
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Table 5: Distance by education level and honorary title. Average distance between the province of the 
bank’s headquarters and the manager’s province of birth for President, CEO, and General Manager, by 
education  level,  and  honorary  title;  1993-2001.  Distance  is  defined  by  the  distance  between  the 
geographical coordinates of two provinces corrected for the earth surface curvature. For a description of 
the other variables and their sources see Table 1. 
  Distance in Km 










  P-value for no association: 0.000 
  Distance in Km 










  P-value for no association: 0.000 
 
 
Table 6: Average tenure (in years) of Presidents, CEOs and General Managers by bank category. 
Results  were  obtained  by  fitting  a  lognormal  parametric  model  to  take  right  censoring into account. 
Separate models were estimated for the three positions considered. 
Category of banks  President  CEO  General Manager  Total 
Commercial and Savings banks  7.09  4.31  3.73  5.37 
Mutual, Cooperatives, and Rural banks  9.99  na  3.86  9.10  




Table  8:  Distance  for  movers.  Distribution  of  the  distance  between  the  province  of  the  bank's 
headquarters province and the manager’s province of birth (only movers). For a description of the variable 
‘distance’ see Table 5. 
Commercial and Savings banks (number of observations: 681) 
  5%  25%  50%  75%  95% 
President 
(number of obs.: 197) 
0.00  0.00  68.04  201.31  483.45 
CEO 
(number of obs.: 167) 
0.00  30.85  79.52  246.85  826.66 
General Manager 
(number of obs.: 317) 
0.00  36.58  135.17  300.21  738.65 
Mutual, Cooperatives and Rural banks (number of observations: 163) 
  5%  25%  50%  75%  95% 
President 
(number of obs.: 95) 
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  79.82 
General Manager 
(number of obs.: 68) 




Table 7: Survival probabilities. Kaplan-Meyer estimates for “more connected” (distance = 0) and “less 
connected” (distance > 0) managers. 
































































for equality of 
survival 
functions 
P-value: 0.000  P-value = 0.2727  P-value = 0.005  
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Figure 1a. Percentage of surviving Presidents. Survival probabilities of  more connected (distance = 0) and less 
connected  (distance  >  0)  managers  for  low  performing  banks  (bottom  25%  of  the  distribution  of  ROE  and  high 
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Figure 1b. Percentage of surviving Presidents. Survival probabilities of more connected (distance = 0) and less 
connected (distance > 0) managers for low performing banks (bottom 25% of the distribution of EBITDA/Total Assets) 
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Figure 2. Percentage of surviving CEOs Survival probabilities of more connected (distance = 0) and less connected 
(distance > 0) managers for low performing banks (bottom 25% of the distribution of ROE or EBITDA/Total Assets) 
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Figure 3a. Percentage of surviving General Managers. Survival probabilities of more connected (distance = 0) and 
less connected (distance > 0) managers for low performing banks (bottom 25% of the distribution of ROE and high 
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Figure 3b. Percentage of surviving General Managers. Survival probabilities of more connected (distance = 0) and 
less connected (distance > 0) managers for low performing banks (bottom 25% of the distribution of EBITDA/Total 
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Table 9. Average percentage effect of connection on survival probabilities for each position across 
bank type. Results are obtained by estimating equation (2) as explained in Section 5.2. P-vales are in 
brackets.   
  Presidents  CEOs  General 
Managers 
Average difference in survival probabilities between “more” 














Values of the first 
derivate of the hazard rate 
( ( )
2 2 log S T −∂ ∂  
  See  eq. 2) 









Table 10. Connections of the top managers as a whole and bank performance and survival. Variables referring 
to  the  top  managers  have  been  computed  as  averages  over  the  past  three  years.  All  regressions  use  only  one 
observation per bank at each point in time. Columns (1) and (2) report bank Fixed Effect estimates of performance 
on a set of variables including characteristics of the bank and time controls. Columns (3) and (4) report Fixed Effect 
(or  Conditional) Logit estimates of the indicator "Bank  not observed at time t"  on a set  of  variables including 
characteristics of the bank, performance as well as time controls. A local manager is defined by distance = 0. Robust 
standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
  Dependent variable 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  ROE          EBITDA/  Bank Survival Bank Survival 




% of local managers  0.2479  -0.0026  -5.8977  -5.1983 
  [0.2510]  [0.0030]  [16.4824]   [18.0115]  








         
Average distance of top managers in each bank  -0.0070  -0.0093*  -0.0389  -0.0361 
  [0.4385]  [0.0053]  [0.0274]   [0.0318]  










         
2° quartile of bank performance      -0.8725  -0.1324 
      [0.9933]  [0.8610] 
3° quartile of bank performance      0.2141  0.0437 
      [1.0839]  [0.9974] 
4° quartile of bank performance      0.9922  -0.0813 
      [1.1199]  [1.2849] 
         
N. Observations  3279  3279  572  572 
P-value of test for the joint significance of "% of  
local managers " and its interactions 
0.5600  0.2600  0.0127  0.0196 
P-value of test for the joint significance of "Average 
distance of top managers" and its interactions 
0.8660  0.0624  0.3550 
 
0.5030  
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Table  11.  Connections  of  the  top  managers  and  bank  performance.  All  columns  report  Fixed  Effect  (FE) 
estimates of bank performance (ROE, EBITDA/Total Assets) on a set of variables including characteristics of the 
bank, characteristics of the manager and time controls. Results in column (1) and (3) account for bank FE only, 
while results in column (2) and (4) controls also manager for manager FE using data for "movers". A local manager 
is defined by distance = 0. Robust standard errors in brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
  Dependent variable 
  ROE  EBITDA/ Total Assets 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Bank FE  Bank and 
Manager FE 
Bank FE  Bank and 
Manager FE 
Dummy for local manager   0.0077  -0.5851  0.0002  -0.0081 
  [0.1478]  [0.5630]  [0.0022]  [0.0057] 
Distance  -0.0000  -2.0857  0.0012  -0.0766 
  [0.0002]  [8.7862]  [0.0041]  [0.0477] 
Distance squared  -0.0000  5.8800  -0.0004  0.1100 
  [0.0000]  [18.0000]  [0.0006]  [0.0789] 
















Distance X  concentration  -0.0004  -23.4540  -0.0094  0.3345** 
  [0.0004]  [23.1342]  [0.0152]  [0.1395] 
Distance X concentration squared  0.0005  21.3545  0.0077  -0.3839** 
  [0.0004]  [22.6881]  [0.0129]  [0.1747] 
Distance squared X concentration  0.0000  38.6000  0.0025  -0.3210* 
  [0.0000]  [37.4000]  [0.0026]  [0.1820] 
































N. Observations  6547  509  6432  500 
P-value of test for the joint significance of all terms 
that involve the variable "local manager" 
0.1149  0.7064  0.9094  0.2673 
P-value of test for the joint significance of all terms 
that involve the variable "Distance" 
0.4418  0.9173  0.7731  0.0000 
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